Designing a property tax without property values: Analysis in the case of Ireland. ESRI WP352. September 2010 by Tol, Richard S.J. et al.
  
www.esri.ie 
 
 
Working Paper No. 352 
 
September 2010 
 
Designing a property tax without property values: Analysis in 
the case of Ireland 
Karen Mayorab, Seán Lyonsab, and Richard S.J. Tolacdb 
Abstract: We examine the implications of using hedonic regressions of house values as 
the basis for property tax assessment in the Republic of Ireland. Ad valorem property 
taxes are more equitable than flat rate taxes, but their equity benefits can be reduced if 
the relative values of dwellings are inaccurately assessed. Achieving greater accuracy in 
assessment tends to increase administrative costs, so policymakers face a trade-off 
between cost and accuracy. Using the Irish National Survey of Housing Quality of 2002, 
this study analyses the contribution that information about selected property 
characteristics can make to determine the relative values of residential properties in 
Ireland. These characteristics are the location of the dwelling, house size in square 
meters, the number of rooms and bedrooms in the home, the age of the house and the 
type of dwelling. The values of residential properties are estimated using these variables 
in turn and the prediction errors are presented in terms of the absolute value error and 
the assessment ratio (the estimated value divided by the market value). We find that it is 
possible to assign approximately 80% of houses nationally within the correct tax 
valuation band using just one of five house characteristics. Households whose house 
price is under assessed tend to be those with the greatest means (highly skilled 
professionals and high income earners), so a tax assessment system based on this type 
of valuation would tend to make regressive errors (while a property tax itself is regressive 
too). Consequently, checks would need to be put in place in order to more accurately 
estimate very highly priced properties as well as introducing exemptions for lower value 
properties and low income groups. The system could also be used to identify likely mis-
reporting if using a self-assessment system.  
 
Keywords: Property tax, Ireland, Hedonic regressions 
Corresponding Author: Karen.Mayor@esri.ie 
   
a Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin, Ireland  
b Department of Economics, Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland 
c Institute for Environmental Studies, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, The Netherlands  
d Department of Spatial Economics, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, The Netherlands  
 
ESRI working papers represent un-refereed work-in-progress by researchers who are solely 
responsible for the content and any views expressed therein. Any comments on these papers will be 
welcome and should be sent to the author(s) by email. Papers may be downloaded for personal use 
only. 
 2
Designing a property tax without property values:  
Analysis in the case of Ireland 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The collapse in house prices in Ireland over the past three years has resulted in a much 
thinner property market with owners waiting for house prices to increase before 
selling and buyers waiting for prices to drop further before buying. The thin property 
market has had a direct effect on the tax yield from property in Ireland, as the main 
source of revenue in this area is a transactions based tax: stamp duty. 
The Commission on Taxation Report of 2009 recommended the implementation of a 
property tax. In the first instance, the Commission suggests, house values under a 
property tax scheme should be self-assessed. The report also recommends that a 
national register of house prices should be established. The latter suggestion was 
recently taken up by the government but it will still require time and a lot of resources 
to establish a full dataset of dwelling prices. 
In addition to self assessment and in advance of developing a national house price 
register, we suggest that hedonic methods can efficiently assign most residences to the 
correct tax bands. Indeed, hedonic methods are widely used as part of the valuation 
process in systems where property values are assigned by a valuation agency 
(McCluskey et al., 1997). In this paper we evaluate how closely one can predict house 
prices by using simple hedonic regression analysis, using readily available and 
verifiable variables. This study looks at whether or not it is possible to classify house 
values for taxation purposes in a manner that depends on more stable and robust 
criteria than the latest transactions on the housing market. How much information on 
a home would be required in order to accurately predict into which tax band this home 
falls? Could a system of this type be used to identify potential mis-reporting by home-
owners through targeted audits? 
Hedonic analysis decomposes the price of a good or service (a house in this case) into 
its components. With information on the structural characteristics of a dwelling, its 
precise location and neighbourhood characteristics, it is possible to closely predict the 
price of a home. The trade-off in this case is between more information (which is 
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administratively costly) and more accurate predictions, versus less information but 
more inaccurate predictions.  
We study the errors in the predictions depending on the different explanatory 
variables used (area, rooms, age, dwelling type), the number of variables used and 
who they affect the most (by age groups, income groups, region). That is, we do not 
aim for the “perfect” regression model. Rather, we use a regression model that is 
deliberately simple: the kind that may be used by the tax authorities because of its 
transparency and robustness. We then study the patterns in the forecast errors of the 
simple regression, and test whether these errors correlate with distributional variables. 
We look at the absolute value of the errors in euro as well as the “assessment sales 
ratio” a measure developed by the International Association of Assessing Officers 
(IAAO), which indicates whether the valuation system produces errors which are 
progressive or regressive.  Further aspects of the equitability of the different 
valuations are examined using a dispersion coefficient.   
Property taxes existed previously in Ireland but due to the high number of exemptions 
only a very small proportion of households were taxed. Research on the design of a 
new property tax in the country has recently been published. Callan et al. (2010) look 
at how a property tax in Ireland could be designed in order to take account of ability 
to pay.  They highlight the issues regarding which tax base is used (all land, owner-
occupied, all residential) and how to set tax rates. They focus on the design of the tax 
and use the Economic and Social Research Institute’s tax benefit model to estimate 
the distributional impact on household incomes for a given overall tax revenue target. 
The model also allows the examination of the effect of exemptions for poorer 
households. They find that even if the poorest households in the Republic were to be 
exempt it would still be possible to raise close to 1 billion euro a year. The provision 
of an income exemption limit, marginal relief as well as income-related reliefs would 
safeguard those on lower incomes. The present study looks at how the property 
valuations would be estimated and the consequences of different valuation methods 
on tax equity. 
The remainder of this paper is set out as follows. Section 2 presents some background 
statistics on the housing sector during the Celtic Tiger and the current fiscal system 
relating to property in Ireland. Section 3 describes the Commission for Taxation 
recommendations in detail as well as the features of the previously existing property 
tax in Ireland. Section 4 reviews the literature in the area of property tax design, 
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property assessment as well as errors in assessment and studies on property tax equity 
issues. Section 5 presents the different methodologies used to predict house prices and 
evaluate the accuracy of the predictions that are used in this paper. Section 6 provides 
an overview of the data used in the analysis while Section 7 presents the results. 
Finally, Section 8 provides a discussion and conclusions. 
 
2. The Irish housing market and fiscal system 
 
The Celtic Tiger years in Ireland were characterised by rapid and sustained income 
growth. Increasing disposable incomes and a culture of home ownership resulted in 
massive increases in property prices as investors bought multiple properties, home 
owners sought to upgrade and first time buyers tried to get on the property ladder. As 
shown in Figure 1, average national house prices increased from €65’000 to €323’000 
between 1990 and 2007. But, as is also clear from Figure 1, this rapid growth came to 
a sudden end that year.  
In Ireland, property features in the taxation system in a number of ways. Capital gains 
tax is paid on the gains made from the disposal of assets including property, although 
principal private residences are excluded from this tax as it is aimed at investors. 
Capital acquisitions tax applies to property that is inherited or gifted. Property also 
features in relation to income tax through mortgage interest relief. Home owners 
receive tax relief in relation to their mortgages for a set number of years. In 2009 the 
government introduced a tax on second homes which was a flat rate tax of 200 euro 
on all non primary residences. The most important property related tax in Ireland over 
the last ten years and the main source of tax revenue from residential property during 
the boom years has been stamp duty.  
Stamp duty is a transactions tax and is paid to the government at the sale of a 
property. The rules regarding the incidence of stamp duty did change over the course 
of the Celtic Tiger years but overall the level of duty to be paid was based on the 
value of the home and exemptions were made for first time buyers and purchases of 
second hand properties. Stamp duty receipts were very high during the boom years as 
the number of sales grew and prices rose. As is shown in Figure 2, property as a 
percentage of total stamp duty grew steadily over the period and stamp duties from 
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residential property resulted in 1.3 billion euro in tax revenue to the Exchequer in 
2006.  
One downside of using stamp duty as the main source of tax revenue on property is 
that receipts from it tend to be volatile and procyclical. When the current property 
market slump took hold in 2007 and the number of transactions fell dramatically, this 
had an immediate effect on tax revenues. The OECD (2009) stated that “tax revenues 
became too dependent on construction and housing transaction-related receipts as the 
market boomed”. In one year alone (2006-2007) stamp duties from residential 
property fell by 300 million euro. The now relatively stagnant property market has 
resulted in a huge shortfall in tax revenue for the government which, combined with 
the reductions in tax revenue due to the recession is problematic. Consequently, the 
government has rightly decided to move away from stamp duty in favour of a more 
stable property tax.  
A property tax is a tax on owners of property and can be levied as a flat rate (i.e. all 
owners pay the same amount for each property) or as an ad valorem tax (i.e. based on 
the value of the property). Receipts from such taxes tend to be more stable than stamp 
duty as they are based on the value of the housing stock and not on the flow of 
transactions. They may also decrease speculation and vacancy rates as people do not 
want to pay taxes on empty properties. A property tax can help lower transactions 
costs when purchasing property (as it would replace stamp duty). This would in turn 
make the housing market more liquid, so that fewer people would live in the “wrong” 
house (e.g., young families who cannot afford to move to larger houses, or empty 
nesters who stay in large family homes). Furthermore, property taxes should give rise 
to less deadweight loss and be less damaging to the competitiveness of Irish exports 
than income taxes; and they should be less damaging to Ireland as a destination for 
foreign direct investment than profit taxes. In sum, if properly implemented property 
taxes are seen as an efficient and stable source of revenue. The implementation of a 
property tax in Ireland was one of the subjects of a comprehensive review by the 
Commission on Taxation in 2009, which we discuss in the following section. 
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3. Commission on Taxation recommendations and the old property tax 
 
In 2009, the Commission on Taxation issued a comprehensive report on possible 
changes in the structure of the Irish fiscal system. The relevant sections relating to the 
current study will be presented in Section 3.1 while Section 3.2 details the 
characteristics of the previously existing property tax in Ireland.  
 
3.1 The Commission on Taxation 
The Commission on Taxation was established in 2008 to “review the structure, 
efficiency and appropriateness of the Irish taxation system”.1 The final report was 
published in 2009 and part 6 deals with the taxation of property. The six main 
recommendations made by the Commission are presented in Box 1 and are discussed 
in further detail below along with the main comments on implementation issues and 
design.  
 
Box 1. Recommendations on the Taxation of Property by the Commission on 
Taxation. 
6.1 The provision of an up-to-date valuation base for all property and land in Ireland should be addressed as a priority issue. 
6.2 
Provide for an annual property tax on all residential housing units with the 
broad exceptions of local authority and social housing units and some other 
limited exceptions set out in section 4.2 of Part 6. 
6.3 Stamp duty for purchasers of principal private residences should be zero-rated. 
6.4 
Stamp duty should continue to apply to investor purchasers of residential 
housing units. The rate should be competitive having regard to the transaction 
tax rates and thresholds that apply across the EU. 
6.5 The windfall gains increases in land values due to rezoning decisions should be subject to an additional capital gains tax charge. 
6.6 A recurrent property tax on land zoned for development should be introduced.  
Source:  CoT (2009:154). 
 
                                                 
1 http://www.commissionontaxation.ie/  
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“We consider that an annual property tax (APT) should be implemented at the earliest 
possible date, taking account of the very significant administrative challenge for the 
Revenue Commissioners who will have to develop an assessment, collection and 
accounting system” (2009:157). The Commission acknowledges the implementation 
difficulties of introducing a property tax. The main difficulties usually cited with 
regards the implementation of this sort of tax are administration procedures, 
monitoring, setting up an appeals system, deciding rates, enforcing penalties and, 
evidently, assessment (Szalai and Tassonyi, 2004). Although introducing a property 
tax for inclusion in the next (2010) Budget is looking less likely, the government has 
indicated that it has not yet been examined in any detail2. The complexity of 
introducing a tax of this kind in an equitable manner is high and if a property tax 
based on house size or value is to be put into operation it will require time. The main 
issue and the one examined in this paper will be the assessment of house values.  
The Commission on Taxation also broaches this subject. “Options for the future 
taxation of property in Ireland are constrained by the absence of an up-to-date 
valuation database on which an annual property tax could be based. An up-to-date 
valuation database will also provide a database against which self-assessed property 
tax returns can be checked as part of the monitoring of our proposed annual property 
tax” (2009:160). The Minister for Housing has since the publication of the CoT report 
announced the establishment of an expert group to look at the matter of establishing a 
national register of house prices.3 To our knowledge the group has not yet produced 
any publications.  
A flat rate tax (where all owners pay the same fee) was recently ruled out by the 
Minister for the Environment4 and consequently an ad valorem tax is most likely. 
This system requires an estimate of relative house values. The Commission suggests 
self-assessment as a solution to the lack of property register. “We consider self-
assessment is an appropriate method of assessment for the tax subject to appropriate 
monitoring and audit mechanisms. It is greatly simplified by the banding of 
valuations. […] We acknowledge that direct assessment would provide greater 
certainty for taxpayers. However, in our view, it is not capable of being implemented 
                                                 
2 “Fall in values reduces scope for property tax – Lenihan”, The Irish Times, 19th July 2010. 
3 “Government group looks at house price index”, AIB Global Treasury fxcentre, 10th March 2010. 
4 “Gormley rules out flat-rate property and water taxes”, The Irish Times, 09th June 2010. 
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within an appropriate time-frame due to the lack of an existing valuation database for 
residential properties” (2009:165). Although self-assessment may seem an attractive 
option due to a lack of national house price database, there are a number of issues 
with the method. First, had a self-assessing property tax been implemented during the 
Celtic Tiger years, when house transactions and sales were numerous, home owners 
would have had a lot more information about the possible value of their homes and 
the government would have had a lot more transactions to compare prices with when 
monitoring self-assessed values. Unfortunately, this policy is likely to be introduced at 
a time when the market is extremely thin. Volumes are so low that the ESRI/PTSB 
house price index has recently been reduced to a quarterly index (instead of monthly) 
because of insufficient observations of transactions. Consequently, not only will it be 
difficult for home owners to self-assess due to a lack of prices to compare their 
property with, but with prices still falling, the task is made even more difficult. 
Moreover, as is discussed in Section 4, self-assessment only tends to work if proper 
enforcement and penalties are put into place. This will take time and require 
significant resources to become effective, which may be problematic in the current 
tight fiscal climate. “As with any self-assessment tax but particularly so in the case of 
a new tax such as the APT it is vital that there is a clear understanding from the 
outset by taxpayers that the tax will be subject to appropriate audit and compliance 
actions monitoring” (2009:169). As all properties registering for the tax will be newly 
registered, monitoring at the national scale will be a very extensive enterprise and 
leave the door open to under-valuations and cheating on the part of home-owners. 
Consequently, in this paper we investigate whether or not an additional method of 
valuation is feasible. 
“Each householder who is liable to pay the tax and who gets a professional 
assessment of the value of his or her property should get a tax credit of up to €75 in 
the first year to compensate for costs incurred” (2009:165). Although the use of 
professional valuers is a good idea and more likely to result in more accurate 
valuations, the thin property market issue still applies. Furthermore, determining 
house prices in the current market really depends on finding a buyer and to which year 
the current price is being compared to. It will be difficult to set a baseline “house 
value” without more accurate guidelines, even for valuers. 
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In this paper, we use property characteristics to examine how accurately one can 
estimate house prices using a limited set of house characteristics and county dummies. 
We are particularly interested in whether using any of the property characteristics 
would result in estimates of house value that would still be considered equitable. For 
example, “We examined market value and floor space as possible bases for the tax. 
We consider that using floor space alone as a base for the tax would offend the 
principle of equity. A residential property owner who lives in or owns a 1200 square 
foot house in an affluent area should pay more tax than one who lives in a similar 
sized house in a less affluent area” (2009:165). While this statement is true, taking 
into account regional differences could mitigate this problem. We will underline the 
importance of regional characteristics in the Section 6.  
“We also considered using a combination of floor space and market value as the tax 
base. The introduction of a new annual property tax will be a significant challenge for 
the Government, who will have to convince taxpayers that it is an appropriate policy 
approach. For this reason, the rules that govern the assessment and calculation of the 
tax should be as simple as possible so that taxpayers can calculate their tax with 
reference to as few parameters as is feasible. We consider that the application of floor 
space in addition to the market value would add undue complexity for householders 
liable to pay the tax” (2009:165). Although the addition of parameters inevitably 
complicates a tax assessment, the calculation of the tax incidence tends to fall on the 
government side. Consequently, a professional assessment as recommended above 
could also include the number of rooms in the home and its square footage without 
any extra undue complexity. The reporting of additional parameters should not be 
difficult; however the administration of a tax based on a more complex system may 
be. The purpose of the analysis will also be to investigate the trade-off between the 
cost of additional variables and the resulting benefits in terms of equity and the 
reduction in the error in estimation. 
“There should be a fixed valuation date, set at a date in advance of the 
commencement of the tax, so that all house owners self-assess at the same time” 
(2009:165). One advantage when starting a property tax scheme from scratch is that 
all valuations have a common date. The issue usually faced by other countries is that 
valuations do not have a common date. The main issue then is to determine how often 
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the valuations need to be updated. The Commission does not recommend a rate for the 
property tax and states that it is “a matter for Government” (2009:159).  
Although the CoT does not recommend a rate for the tax it does give an example of 
possible valuation bands. “The annual property tax should be calculated by reference 
to valuation bands within which a property owner would value his or her house. Our 
rationale is that there should be certainty about the tax base. Therefore, the 
classification of a property for the tax should be easily determined” (2009:161). 
These bands increase in €150’000 steps and are presented in Table 6. We will try and 
determine how far the use of property characteristics leads to accurate assignment of 
properties to the specified bands. 
The issue of who should pay the tax is also addressed by the Commission. “The tax 
should apply to all residential housing units including holiday homes, second homes 
and houses that are let or available for letting. It should also apply to vacant houses 
[…] and to bed and breakfast and guesthouse accommodation” (2009:164). The 
dataset used in our analysis is presented in detail in Section 5. We concentrate our 
analysis on owner-occupiers as it allows us to analyse the impact of the tax based on 
the owners’ household characteristics. The Commission stresses the issue of taking 
into consideration the ability to pay of the most vulnerable. “Exemptions for local 
authorities and other social housing providers, care facilities, nursing homes, 
boarding school accommodation, charities” (2009:164). Owners who paid stamp 
duty during the previous seven years “would be exempted from paying the annual 
property tax for a seven year period from the year they paid stamp duty” (2009:168). 
This would be to avoid double taxation those who not only bought at the height of the 
boom and paid stamp duty but who are also those most likely to currently be in 
negative equity. “The annual property tax should be applied to all housing stock, 
including vacant units” (2009:168). Property taxes are said to discourage speculation 
as they make holding on to vacant properties more expensive. 
Finally, the main point stressed by the Commission is the issue of equity. “We 
considered a flat charge per property but rejected it as inequitable. We consider that 
owners of more valuable properties should pay more tax than those who own less 
valuable properties. The banded valuation system we are proposing provides for a 
proportionate system of taxation […]. We also considered but rejected a progressive 
tax as it would be more difficult to administer than a proportionate tax using 
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valuation bands” (2009:167) and “In making these proposals we are aware of two 
issues which we consider are important aspects of an APT on residential property: 
[…] the provision of a scheme to mitigate the impact of the recurrent property tax on 
low-income house owners, including those with relatively low income and large more 
valuable houses” (2009:161). The property tax that existed in Ireland in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s was perceived by most to be inequitable. It is crucial, especially in a 
time of recession that those with more valuable properties pay more tax and those 
with less are given additional support. However, it will also be essential to take 
account of those in society who by circumstance have low incomes despite owning 
large properties. Making allowances for these cases will enhance the equity of the tax 
and make it more likely to be accepted by the public.5  
The research conducted by the Commission on Taxation into the implementation of a 
property tax in Ireland is extensive and thorough. The main issue as underlined by the 
Commission is the lack of a property database in Ireland. Unfortunately, self-
assessment as recommended by the Commission in response to the lack of database is 
more difficult in a thin property market. The object of the present paper is to examine 
the types of inequities that may or may not arise when using house characteristics 
such as floor space or number of rooms to value a dwelling. Estimating the scale of 
these inequities and who they would impact is important prior to a tax being 
implemented. 
 
3.2 Historical property tax in Ireland 
Property taxes are not new to Ireland. Indeed a Residential Property Tax (RPT) 
existed in Ireland between 1983 and 1997.6 “The tax was charged at the rate of 1.5% 
on the excess of the market value of all relevant residential properties of a person over 
a market value exemption limit and was payable provided the income of the 
household exceeded an income exemption limit.” 7 It was an annual tax, chargeable 
                                                 
5 Two other points of interest are:“The tax should be applied on the gross value of the property without 
regard to borrowing to fund its purchase” (2009:164) and “After an appropriate introductory period, all 
of the revenues from an annual property tax should be used for local government financing” 
(2009:168). 
6 Commission on Taxation (page 156) provides an overview of the previous residential property 
taxation systems in Ireland. The main one of note is the RPT. 
7 http://www.revenue.ie/en/tax/rpt/index.html  
 12
on the market value of residential property, owned and occupied on the 5th April of 
each year which was the valuation date.  
The RPT was a national tax but due to the number of exemptions related to it, only a 
very small number of home-owners actually paid it. Indeed, exemptions existed for 
owners of homes under a certain value (£101’000) and whose income was below a 
threshold (£30’100). Owners provided an assessment of their home value and if the 
Revenue Commissioners considered it to be too low it could re-value the property. 
The tax was very unpopular with the general public for its perceived lack of equity. It 
was considered a “Dublin tax as the capital accounted for almost two thirds of the 
revenue collected”.8 As a consequence it generated very little revenue and according 
to the CoT (2009:157) it resulted in only 17 million euro in receipts in 1996 and was 
paid by only 2% of all households. 
Making sure that these mistakes are not repeated will be crucial in the implementation 
of a new property tax in Ireland. Indeed the CoT states that “An important lesson to 
be learned from the residential property tax system that operated between 1983 and 
1997 is that an overly narrow tax base led to an insignificant revenue flow for the 
Exchequer, high administrative costs and a perception of inequity” (2009:157). The 
following section reviews the academic literature regarding various aspects of 
property tax design and assessment as well as the case of Northern Ireland.  
 
4. Literature 
 
This section reviews the literature in the area of property tax design, property value 
assessment and property tax equity. First the concepts of horizontal and vertical equity 
as well as regressivity and progressivity are defined. Then, existing studies on various 
aspects of property taxes are presented, first regarding the efficiency of self-
assessment, then the assessment of property taxes in thin markets and implementation 
issues. Section 4.4 describes the case of Northern Ireland which has recently had to 
revalue its property database.   
 
                                                 
8 “Property Investor” Irish Times, June 17th, 2010. 
 13
4.1 Equity and fairness in taxation 
The issues of equity and fairness in taxation are central to most of the academic 
literature in the area. While they will not be discussed in depth in this paper it is worth 
underlining the main characteristics a tax can have and what features are used to 
assess it. The three aspects of a tax that tend to be used to evaluate it are: efficiency, 
equity and administrative simplicity. 
Inevitably, the introduction of a new tax at a national level will incur additional 
administrative costs for the body or bodies in charge of collecting it. In the case of 
Ireland and in the case of the tax as proposed by the CoT the bulk of these 
administrative costs would be in compliance and monitoring of tax assessments. Costs 
would also need to be taken into account depending on the appeals system. If dwelling 
characteristics were used to determine house value, additional information and 
estimations would be required, resulting in more costs. The trade-off is then between 
additional information and hence cost, versus greater accuracy and fairness.  
Tax assessment methods can lead to inequity in several ways depending on how and 
whom a tax targets. According to Allen and Dare (2002) a tax is vertically inequitable 
if there is systematic variation in the assessed value compared to the market value 
across property types and property value bands. Using the methodology described in 
Section 5, vertical inequity would occur if there was a systematic difference in the 
assessment sales ratios for properties that have low versus high market values. 
Horizontal inequity occurs when properties of similar market value are assessed 
differently. Inevitably some variation in assessment will occur depending on who 
values the property and a small amount of horizontal inequity is to be expected, 
however horizontal inequity can also be due to valuer bias. For instance, some valuers 
may systematically place a higher value on certain property attributes compared to 
others. It can also arise when neighbourhood characteristics are not known to the 
valuer.  
A tax can also be deemed regressive or progressive depending on how it affects 
households. A regressive tax is a tax where the rate decreases as the amount subject to 
the tax increases, i.e. relative to their total income the poor suffer more than the rich. 
A progressive tax is a tax where the rate increases as the taxable amount increases; 
personal income taxes are often progressive. The rich pay a higher percentage of 
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income in tax than the poor. With regard to vertical inequity, if lower value house 
prices are always over-valued compared to high valued houses then the valuation 
method is regressive. If lower value house prices are always assessed at a lower rate 
than their market rate compared to high value houses then the valuation method is 
progressive. All of these possible impacts should be assessed when implementing a 
new tax and we will be looking at whether valuations based on dwelling 
characteristics satisfy the equity principles.  
 
4.2 Self-assessment and the tax system 
Plassmann and Tideman (2008) provide an accurate description of the common issue 
related to self-assessment: “A person who is subject to self-assessment can be 
expected to provide a truthful report of the (monetary equivalent of the) value that he 
attaches to a good that he owns if and only if truthful reporting maximises his utility”. 
Consequently, when using self-assessment for tax purposes, any utility maximising 
agent under-estimates the value of the good that is taxed. Potential solutions to this 
problem date back centuries. 
Bird (1984) presents examples of countries that use a property tax system with self-
assessment that gives the government the right to purchase at declared value. The 
earliest documented example he gives is of New Zealand in the late 19th century. If 
home owners deemed their valuation excessive they could value it themselves at a 
lower rate on condition that the government could purchase the property at that rate 
plus a “fair margin”. In parallel the land owner could force the government to 
purchase the property at the higher official value. Bird also quotes the example of 
Columbia in the 1950s and 1960s. However due to the economic situation at the time 
there was no credible threat from the government as it could not afford to purchase the 
properties. This might be the case of Ireland at the moment, especially in the 
aftermath of NAMA purchases. Niou and Tan (1994) discuss a similar method 
proposed in China in 1905. They examine this “truth-revelation mechanism” and find 
that with two forms of penalties (compulsory purchase and taxes) there is still a small 
probability that some land owners will under-report. This probability is reduced with 
important random audits but this entails an additional cost to the government. Their 
model does not discover a mechanism that induces correct self-assessment at no cost. 
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In cases where the threat of purchase on both sides is credible, self-assessment can 
work. 
This is shown by Gstach (2009) who uses a theoretical model to prove that a Nash 
equilibrium among tax payers exists in a game where the property tax is based on the 
owner’s self-assessment but only in the case where the credibility of the purchase 
threat is real and the government purchases a randomly selected number of properties 
based on the distribution of declared property values. This leads to all home-owners 
declaring their true property values and no purchases are required on the 
government’s side. The equilibrium situation however rests on the credible threat of 
repurchase and the repurchasing price. Wolinsky (2000) offers a “softer” version of 
the scheme whereby an option would be given to home owners to have their 
assessment value defined though a centralised processed.  Homeowners wanting to 
determine their own house price could still do so but this would constitute an 
obligation to sell. In reality and in Ireland this is unlikely to occur and the use of self-
assessment will hence in all likelihood lead to dwelling values being under-declared. 
The problems relating to self-assessment are exacerbated when the property market is 
thin as it makes it difficult for home owners to correctly assess their house value when 
they do not have many prices to compare it to.  
 
4.3 Thin markets and property tax assessment 
Most of the literature on errors in property tax assessment is based on studies of 
markets with existing property taxes. Consequently the questions asked by authors of 
these studies are whether the current tax regime is equitable and if not how to best 
remedy the situation. The following papers, mostly from the United States, detail 
some of the methodologies used to assess the horizontal and vertical inequity of 
existing property tax regimes.  
McMillen and Weber (2008) investigate the horizontal and vertical inequities in 
property taxation in Chicago. They use property tax assessment ratios (i.e. a 
property’s assessed value divided by its market value) to determine when these 
inequities appear. Assessment ratios can vary between and within price segments of 
the market. Horizontal inequity occurs when there is a lack of information on property 
and neighbourhood factors available to agents (buyers, sellers and valuers). Vertical 
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inequity occurs when higher priced properties appreciate more quickly compared to 
repeat assessment times. The authors in this case investigate the effect of a thin 
market and low sales in certain areas on relative assessment ratios. They test the 
notion “that assessment ratios will be not only less uniform but also higher in areas 
where prices are relatively unpredictable”. “Assessments of land and improvements in 
inactive markets may vary significantly for nearly identical properties in the same 
price strata and may well be biased systematically”. The authors use data on sale 
prices in Chicago in 2004 and 2005 as well as assessment data from 2003 to conduct 
their analysis. They check to see if assessments are more uniform in areas with more 
sales. They look at thin markets (at the top and bottom ends of the scale) and find that 
there is regressivity: as prices increase the assessment ratios fall. They also find that 
the assessment ratio declines over time. The authors conclude that in areas with more 
sales, assessment ratios are more likely to cluster in the center of the distribution, i.e. 
having more sales makes it easier to produce uniform assessments. Thick markets 
improve horizontal equity.  
Goolsby (1997) analyses house prices as assessed by valuers to determine whether 
systematic errors occur in valuation. In the United States assessors are legally required 
to assess a property at a level equal to the market value but when property prices are 
increasing this will tend to result in a ratio smaller than one. If the assessment ratios 
were the same across the board there would not be a problem however they are 
generally not uniform. Goolsby uses data from Washington State in 1993 on owner-
occupied single family houses. He regresses the assessment ratio on variables that are 
thought to cause a consistent bias in the estimates. He finds that valuers tend to under-
assess high value houses and older properties and over-assess very large houses across 
all counties. He concludes that using valuers’ estimates of house values should be 
taken with caution and in the best case should be adjusted to take account of 
consistent assessor bias.  
Allen and Dare (2002) also look at assessment error, in particular its impact on equity 
when using an ad valorem property tax. When dealing with this type of tax the issue 
of correctly assessing the relative house value is crucial. The authors concentrate on 
the issue of horizontal inequity using sample data from Florida. Florida uses computer 
aided mass appraisal models to estimate a property’s value for tax purposes each year. 
Similarly to Goolsby (1995), they find that older and larger homes as well as 
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properties in neighbourhoods with a higher percentage of minority residents present 
the highest level of assessment error. They do not find much evidence of vertical 
inequity but do find indications that the middle quartiles of house values 
systematically differ from the bottom and top quartile, similarly to the results in 
Goolsby (1995). Allen et al. (2009) revisit the issue of vertical inequity due to 
property taxation for owners of hotels in Florida between 1999 and 2004. The issue of 
valuing hotels is more complex than homes as the value of the business must be 
separated from the value of the property. They find that lower value properties are 
systematically over assessed and that this is not the case for high value properties. 
This suggests that owners of lower value hotels should contest their valuations and get 
re-assessed. 
Spahr and Sunderman (1998) also look at property tax inequities but concentrate on 
agricultural property taxation. In Wyoming, agricultural property tax is based on the 
land’s productive value. They use land sales in Wyoming from 1989 to 1995 and data 
on the characteristics of the land to create a predictive hedonic model. They then 
estimate assessed value ratios and calculate the coefficients of dispersion and price 
related differentials. They compare their results to the standards used for residential 
property and find that there is excessive vertical, horizontal and market inequity in the 
taxing of agricultural land, and that farms and ranches under the existing system are 
being under-assessed by nearly 50%. Correct valuation could result in between 8 and 
14 million extra dollars in revenue a year. 
Chapman et al. (2009) focus on a land value tax and look at the effect of levying taxes 
on land that is mis-valued. As the use of a plot of land determines its economic value 
it can be difficult to determine its price and estimates can be prone to error. They find 
that mis-valuing the land essentially results in applying two tax rates: one to the true 
value of land and a different one to the capital. Land value taxation has neutrality 
advantages but are these eliminated if the value of the land is not assessed correctly.  
Smith (2000) tests for vertical inequity in Indiana for sales data from 1993 to 1998 
using the assessed value to market value ratio, and tests whether the assessment 
process in Indiana should be overhauled. Indeed, Indiana does not use the assessed 
market value of a property as the basis for the tax but rather the “true tax value” which 
uses rules, definitions and photographs as well as depreciation tables to determine 
value. The system was deemed unconstitutional in 1996 because it ignored hard data 
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on values. The full ruling was subsequently overturned but amendments were made to 
regulations requiring the valuation to be equitable. Smith employs the different 
methodologies available in the literature (most of which are explained in more detail 
in section 3) to test Indiana’s property tax. He finds that in nearly all cases a 
progressive assessment system is observed. He concludes that focusing just on 
inequity in general is limiting and that it should be related to other aspects of 
properties (such as location, age and type of dwelling). 
Bell and Kirschner (2009) look at the effects that public pressure has had on the level 
of property tax in the US. They look at two ways of calculating property tax burdens 
that are used by States and different jurisdictions in the US, namely the tax per capita 
and the tax as a percentage of housing value. They outline the different methodologies 
and tax bases used by different US bodies for calculating burdens. Some calculate the 
effective tax rates by using the assessment ratio times the nominal tax rate, some use 
the net tax liability, some present burdens by property type or by jurisdiction. They 
conclude that not using microdata for the calculations of these burdens hinders any 
type of equity related research at a within State or within jurisdiction level. 
Szalai and Tassonyi (2004) look at the issues involved in implementing a value based 
property tax in Hungary using the United States as an example. Taxes on residential 
properties, which were imposed at a municipal level were terminated in the early 
1990s mostly by local politicians looking for support. In light of EU accession, 
Hungary’s very mixed fiscal structure needed to be overhauled and an ad valorem 
property tax coupled with economic growth and rising house prices would result in 
local governments having the necessary revenue to invest in the community. Hungary 
has much more defined local municipalities compared to Ireland and they already 
have fiscal responsibilities which would allow property taxes to be implemented more 
easily. The authors present the different administrative issues that would need to be 
taken into account in order to implement the new tax, such as the rates, the assessment 
method, the appeals procedure, and how to determine who should be exempt.  
Existing property taxes in the US tend to result in some form of inequity. It is possible 
to determine which factors cause the inequity and consequently try and find a solution 
to the tax design but most of the issues which arise relate to the assessment of the 
property’s value. The following section presents the case of Northern Ireland which 
recently had to update its property value database. 
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4.4 The case of Northern Ireland 
 
In 2007, the domestic housing sector in Northern Ireland was subject to a complete 
revaluation of all properties for property tax purposes.9 The last valuation of the 
domestic housing sector had occurred in 1976 and in the meantime the property 
market had changed drastically. Previously unwealthy areas had recorded very high 
growth rates and the rate system had not managed to keep up with price increases in 
wealthy neighbourhoods. The resulting system was unfair and considered to 
“disadvantage the less well off” and “the system was not progressive” (Parry, 2006:3). 
Householders were not paying rates in line with the more recent value of their home.  
After public consultations and numerous reviews, a new system was introduced in 
2007. Discussion had centered around whether bands should be used for valuation (as 
used in Great Britain) or whether to introduce discrete individual capital assessments. 
Government commissioned research found that the introduction of a “banded system 
was likely to be a regressive step. Analysis on the likely impact of an individual 
capital value system shows it to be more positive” (Parry, 2006:4). The new system 
was based on individual assessments conducted by the Valuation and Lands Agency 
which aimed to value 700’000 homes with a common valuation date. Discounts and 
special procedures were put in place for those facing a significant price hike due to the 
new system, those in full-time education, and disabled persons. The next revaluation 
is due to take place in 2012.  
The system used in Northern Ireland is one that is quite common in the United States 
and is based on the used of a type of Automated Valuation Model (AVM). The IAAO 
(2003) defines AVM as a: “mathematically based computer software program that 
produces an estimate of market value based on market analysis of location, market 
conditions, and real estate characteristics from information that was previously and 
separately collected. The distinguishing feature of an AVM is that it is a market 
appraisal produced through mathematical modeling. Credibility of an AVM is 
dependent on the data used and the skills of the modeler producing the AVM”.10 The 
system is based on property market sales between 2002 and 2005 which were 
recorded in a specially designed Sales Inspection Database, the data from which was 
                                                 
9 Referred to as “rates”. 
10 The system in Northern Ireland is called CAMA (Computer Assisted Mass Appraisal). 
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then used as the basis for the AVM (Gloudemans and Montgomery, 2008). The most 
important property characteristics affecting sales price were determined across 25 
“sub-markets”. Categories of dwellings (such as apartment, mixed properties) were 
examined separately. The final analysis produced capital values for homes based on 
their potential sales price on the 1st January 2005. These will then be updated again in 
2012. The house price inflation followed by deflation that occurred between 2005 and 
2007 was ignored for the most recent valuation. 
The AVM used in Northern Ireland included significantly more variables than the 
present study as the valuation agency already had information about the house 
characteristics. The variables used were: habitable space, ancillary space, outbuildings 
size, primary classification (public or private build), sub-classification (detached, 
semi-detached, terraced), grade of construction, age band, number of storeys, heating, 
sewerage provision, water provision, power provision, external repair, garage, site 
positive features, site negative features, neighbourhood, location (rural, urban, 
suburban) and access type. As rates were pre-existing, the basic property database 
could be used for the analysis, and the addition of more information was not as costly. 
However the Government committed the funds to conduct a thorough revaluation of 
the full property stock so as to have a solid system and database on which to base any 
further revaluations. In Ireland, as currently no database associating geographical 
information system data on the location of dwellings (and then matched to their 
characteristics) exists, producing a database of this kind would be very expensive. In 
the present study we concentrate on a small number of variables, however it is clear 
that the more information on a dwelling the more accurate the valuation and the fairer 
the system.11 The following section presents the different assessment methods used in 
this paper. 
 
5. Methodology 
 
This section reviews the different methodologies used here to assess the valuation 
method for a property tax. First, the use of hedonic analysis in the estimation of 
                                                 
11 In the US, some states estimate each property’s taxable value from the self-assessed values of the 
surrounding comparable properties, which also reduces the information cost. 
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property prices is discussed. Then, the various errors in house price assessments are 
presented, followed by the techniques used by the International Association of 
Assessing Officers (IAAO), which produces assessment standards for ratio studies 
and property tax policy. 
 
5.1 Predicting house prices 
The hedonic technique is based mainly on work by Griliches (1961) and Rosen (1974) 
and originated in the development of value indices for manufactured products that 
combined measures of quantity and quality. The seminal paper by Griliches (1961) 
derived a hedonic price index for motorcars. The technique centres on consumers’ 
choices regarding composite goods. The assumption is that goods are valued for their 
utility-bearing attributes and that these attributes are internalised into the price of the 
good. A house has several attributes, including attributes of the house itself, such as 
the number of rooms, bathrooms and the availability of car park spaces, as well as 
attributes of its environs, such as crime rates, quality of schools, and air pollution. All 
of these attributes make different contributions to the price of the house. If you have a 
large enough sample of housing market transactions, it is possible to use econometrics 
to separate out the implicit price of the attributes. This is done using a hedonic house 
price model. The basic technique involves regressing the property price on the set of 
variables measuring quality, while controlling for unobserved time and area effects.  
The regression coefficients are then interpreted as marginal implicit prices of the 
quality components.  
The hedonic price function takes the following form: 
ε+= ),,( ENSfPRICE                                                   (1) 
where the price (or logged price of the house) is a function of the house’s structural or 
physical characteristics (number of bedrooms, size in square meters etc.), 
neighbourhood or location characteristics (such as location in the city, access to 
transport routes etc.) and environmental characteristics (such as proximity to green 
spaces, to coast, quality of ambient air); ε is an error term. The house price is thus a 
function of all of the attributes relating to the house and the resulting coefficients are 
the marginal implicit prices of the attributes.  
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The attributes can also be used to produce estimates of the house value. We regress 
house price on one or more readily observable and verifiable house attributes and use 
the results to estimate a house price. How closely this estimate relates to the “correct” 
house price will determine the accuracy of the estimation method – and thus both 
horizontal and vertical equity if this valuation is used as the basis for taxation. The 
variables included in the analysis will be based on those used in Northern Ireland and 
in previous hedonic analyses, such as area in square meters, number of rooms and 
bedrooms, dwelling type (detached, semi-detached, terraced) and geographical 
indicators. It will then be possible to determine how much of house value is 
determined by a single criterion. It is possible that the “bulk” of a house price can be 
determined using just one dwelling characteristic (e.g. size) but it maybe that three or 
four variables are necessary in order to reach a suitably precise house price estimate. 
The following section details how we define “suitably precise”.  
 
5.2 Evaluating the house price assessments 
We look at the errors in the predictions depending on the different explanatory 
variables used (area, rooms, age, dwelling type), the number of variables used and 
who they affect the most (by age groups, income groups, areas). We consider both the 
absolute value of the error in euro and the percentage of the house value. 
The first type of error we identify is the difference between the estimated price and 
the true house price in absolute value. This error is calculated as follows: 
TrueValuealueEstimatedVABV −=                                            (2) 
That is, if the ABV is positive (negative), the dwelling’s value is over-estimated 
(under-estimated). This is a negative (positive) outcome for the home owner as they 
end up paying less (more) tax than they should. Inevitably, some ABVs will be 
positive and some will be negative. There is an implicit cross-subsidy from those 
being over-valued to those being under-valued. The ABV error will give an indication 
as to the absolute amount in euro that is being mis-valued but does not allow us to 
evaluate the equity of the valuation system.  For that, we need to check whether there 
is a systematic mis-valuation of certain kinds of houses. 
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5.3 The assessment to sales price ratio 
The assessment to sales price ratio (A/S) measures the degree of accuracy of a 
valuation. The A/S ratio is the ratio of a property’s assessed value to its sales price. It 
is used extensively in the US to assess the equity of property taxes and is one of the 
guideline ratios recommended by the International Association of Assessing Officers 
(IAAO, 2010). It is calculated as follows: 
eMarketValu
lueAssessedVa
S
A =                                                            (3) 
In the case of this study, we consider the properties to be assessed at 100% of their 
market value so the assessed value will be equal to the appraisal value (i.e. the 
estimate of house price). Most studies of property tax equity are based on data from 
existing property taxes. These studies use the assessed or estimated values of 
properties as per government guidelines and compare them to the market value of 
homes when these are then sold. In the present paper we will be comparing the 
assessed value of the home, as estimated through hedonic regression, to the market 
value, as estimated by the interviewer. If a property is correctly valued then the A/S 
ratio will be one. The valuation method is regressive if the A/S ratio declines with 
increasing property values and is progressive when A/S ratios increase with higher 
property values. A/S ratios tend to be evaluated using the median A/S ratio for the full 
group or specific sub-groups. According to the IAAO (2010:13): “the median is the 
generally preferred measure of central tendency for evaluating overall appraisal level” 
as it is less affected by ratio outliers.12  
From the A/S ratios it is possible to calculate measures of dispersion. Measures of 
variability can be calculated for different groups or sub-groups of data. The main one 
used in studies is the coefficient of dispersion (COD) which Spahr and Sunderman 
(1998) define as: “a non parametric statistic that measures the average deviation of a 
group of A/S ratios, taken around the median and expressed as a percentage of that 
measure”. The COD taken around the median can be calculated using the following 
equation:  
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −= ∑
=
n
i
MEDii
MED
MED nSASASA
COD
1
///
/
100                                     (4) 
                                                 
12 It is also possible to use the mean ratio to compare appraisals. 
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where CODMED is the coefficient of dispersion based on the median value, Ai/Si are 
the individual ratios, n is the number of ratios, and A/SMED is the median ratio for the 
group being examined. It measures the average percentage deviation of the ratios from 
the median ratio. The interpretation of the COD does not depend on the assumption 
that the ratios are normally distributed which makes it the favoured method of 
evaluation. According to the IAAO (2010) “in general more than half the ratios fall 
within one COD of the median”.13 A lower coefficient of dispersion means more 
consistent valuation estimates and equitable treatment.  
The International Association of Assessing Officers also offers guidelines as to the 
acceptable level of these figures. The median A/S ratio should be between 0.9 and 1.1 
(Spahr and Sunderman, 1998). An acceptable coefficient of dispersion (COD) for 
residential dwellings in densely populated, large cities and new properties is between 
5.0 and 10.0. For large to medium sized cities the COD should be between 5.0 and 
15.0 and for rural areas with older properties it can be between 5.0 and 20.0. Figures 
above these boundaries indicate a low degree of assessment uniformity and the 
presence of horizontal inequity. These assessments would be considered more 
variable than acceptable.  
 
5.4 Testing the vertical inequity of the valuation method 
Numerous models have been created that also test the vertical inequity of the house 
price assessments using the A/S ratios. This section provides an overview of these 
different models as detailed in Smith (2000), Allen et al. (2009) and McMillen and 
Weber (2008). The first and most straightforward model is the linear model devised 
by Paglin and Fogerty (1972) where the assessed value is regressed on the sales price: 
iii SA εβα ++=                                                                     (5) 
where Ai is the assessed value of dwelling i and Si is the sales price of dwelling i. As 
the relationship is in this case considered to be linear, if no vertical inequity were 
present, the intercept α would be zero. If the intercept is positive and significant this is 
an indication of a regressive valuation method and if α is negative and significant then 
                                                 
13 In fact, if the uncertainty about the assessed value is normally distributed, as assumed in our 
regression model, 67% of the observations fall in that range. 
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this would be an indication of a progressivity. A slightly updated version, which was 
created by the IAAO (1978), uses the A/S ratio defined in Section 5.3 and is defined 
as follows:  
ii
i
i S
S
A εβα ++=                                                                 (6) 
In this case if β is positive and significant the valuation method is progressive. It is 
regressive if β is negative and significant and if there is no relationship between the 
A/S ratio and the sales price then it is considered neutral. A log model also exists:  
iii SA εβα ++= lnln                                                               (7) 
In this case β measures the vertical inequity in the model. If it is larger than 1 the 
valuation method is progressive and vice versa. If it is equal to 1 the valuation method 
is considered neutral.  
Finally, Bell (1984) incorporated a quadratic term into the regression to take account 
of nonlinear relationships: 
iiii SSA εχβα +++= 2                                                            (8) 
If χ is not statistically significant, the model in equation (5) is used. If χ is statistically 
significantly different from zero and negative then the assessment method “displays 
accelerating regressivity” (Allen et al., 2009:3) and if positive it displays accelerating 
progressivity. If the intercept and χ are both statistically insignificant then there is no 
inequity in the assessment method. The following section presents the survey data and 
the variables used in this analysis as well as summary statistics and checks on the 
reliability of the house price variables.  
 
6. Data 
 
Section 6.1 presents the survey and variables used in the analysis. It also includes 
details on any possible sample restrictions applied to the data. Section 6.2 discusses 
the “house value” variables in more detail.  
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6.1 The survey, sample and variables 
The dataset used in this analysis is the Irish National Survey of Housing Quality 
(NSHQ) which was conducted in 2002 by the Economic and Social Research Institute 
on behalf of the Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government. It 
obtained information from a “representative sample of 40’000 householders on the 
characteristics and problems of the dwelling” (Watson, 2003). Previous national 
housing surveys had been conducted in 1981 and 1991 whoever these had been 
smaller surveys collected at a local authority level and then grouped. The 2002 survey 
is the latest one of its type to be conducted in Ireland.  
The survey contains a number of different variables useful for this analysis. The main 
variable of interest is house value which will be discussed in further detail in Section 
6.2. Variables relating to the properties’ characteristics are used in the hedonic 
regressions. These include the type of dwelling, which contains 5 categories: detached 
house/bungalow, semi-detached house/bungalow, terraced house, flat-apartment and 
flat apartment in a converted house.14 As too few observations were available, the 
final two categories were grouped into a single “apartment” category. Two thirds of 
the sample are detached houses followed by smaller fractions of semi-detached houses 
and terraced houses. This is not unexpected as the survey is a national survey 
including rural areas where the majority of dwellings would be one-off detached 
houses. There are very few apartments in our sample for two reasons: first, apartment 
living in Ireland is a fairly recent phenomenon which is restricted to the cities. Second 
we only kept owner-occupiers in this sample and most apartments bought at the 
beginning of that decade were for rental purposes. Information on the number of 
rooms and bedrooms in the house is available. Also stated is the age of the dwelling, 
which is grouped into 5 categories: pre-1940, 1941 to 1970, 1971 to 1980, 1981 to 
1996 and post-1996. 
Respondents were also asked to state, if known, the size of their dwelling in square 
feet or square meters. Approximately 30% of respondents declared they knew the area 
size of their home and gave a figure. Consequently our sample size for regressions 
using a square meter variable is much smaller. Despite the lower number of available 
                                                 
14 Caravans/mobile homes  were excluded from the analysis. 
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observations, the declared areas are fairly normally distributed (Figure 3).15 The 
average size in square meters is 150m2.  
Geographical dummies are crucial variables as these take into account any area effects 
that influence house prices. A number of these variables are available in the NSHQ. It 
states which region (Border, Dublin, Mid-East, Midlands, Midwest, Southeast, 
Southwest, West), location (Dublin, urban or rural) and the size of the location the 
household is situated in (village, town, city, open country). These variables are useful 
when comparing the incidence of the tax by geographical area. However, more 
detailed geographical location data is needed for inclusion in the hedonic models to 
take account of geographic house price differences. There are 34 local authorities in 
Ireland including 29 county councils and 5 city councils. The NSHQ data lists which 
local authority the dwelling is located in and it is this data that is included in the 
hedonic regressions and is interacted with the variables of interest.  
The full sample of the NSHQ comprises over 40’000 observations. We imposed some 
restrictions on the data. First, for the main analysis we focus on owner-occupiers as 
these are the households that will directly pay the tax. Rented dwellings will also be 
subject to the tax and this may be passed on to renters in whole or in part. Due to 
Ireland’s very high ownership rates, this only reduced the sample by 5’000 
observations. In order to take account of coding errors relating to the price of the 
house (e.g. some dwellings were stated as having a £1 value) we picked a lower end 
cut-off point for house prices. This cut-off was £40’000 for homes outside of Dublin 
and £90’000 for homes in Dublin. These cut-offs are based on the minimum value in 
2002 (the year of the survey) for dwellings in and outside Dublin from the 
ESRI/PTSB house price index micro-data. This restricted the sample to only 
“realistic” house prices. In order to take account of the effect of outliers the top and 
bottom quarter of a percent of observations according to house value were also 
excluded. Due to a lack of sufficient observations we did not include owners of 
caravans or mobile homes in the sample. Finally, houses purchased from a local 
authority were also excluded as they would be likely to be exempt from tax. All 
                                                 
15 The subsample containing values for the area in square meters is representative of the larger sample. 
Both samples have similar proportions of dwelling types and rooms however the sample with an 
estimate of area size have a larger proportion of newer dwellings (post 1996) than the larger sample. 
This can be taken as an indication that households who made more recent purchases are more 
knowledgeable about the size of their home, which is to be expected. Due to this slight difference 
between the samples, the analysis uses both area size and number of rooms throughout.  
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monetary values were converted from Irish pounds into euro. The final sample 
comprises 25’016 observations and 7’023 of these have a value for area size, in square 
meters. 
The summary statistics for the variables included in the analysis are available in Table 
1. It also includes household characteristics for the analysis of groups and sub-groups. 
Variables such as the occupational class of the household (manual, professional, 
skilled, unskilled), the age of the chief economic supporter, the principal economic 
status of the chief economic supporter (at work, unemployed, home duties, student, 
retired, ill) or which income quintile the household falls into are also available. As 
indicated in Table 1, the number of rooms in the dwelling ranges from 2 to 30 while 
the number of bedrooms ranges from 1 to 15. This variable seems to have a very wide 
range however, consistent with expectations, 50% of all dwellings have 3 bedrooms 
or less and 6 rooms or less. 
 
6.2 The house value 
The NSHQ provides three variables relating to house value. The first is the original 
purchase price of the home. This variable is not used in the analysis as it would result 
in homes being valued at different points in time. As we require a consistent estimate 
of house value, we considered the two other variables. The first was an estimate of 
house value made by the owner. The owner was asked: “What price do you think you 
would be able to get for the accommodation if you were to sell it now?”. The second 
estimate was made by the interviewer. Survey interviewers tend to have a good 
knowledge of the area and the local prices and in 2002 the market was far from thin, 
making estimation easier and more likely to be accurate. The interviewer was asked 
the “Estimated value of the accommodation if it were to be sold” (Watson, 2003).  
We subtracted the owner’s estimate from the interviewer’s estimate. We would hope 
to see fairly similar figures and the corresponding difference would then centre 
around zero. The differences between the two estimates for the full sample are plotted 
in the top panel of Figure 4. Approximately 83% of all values are within 20’000€ of 
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the estimate. As is expected, the graph is skewed to the left, indicating the home 
owners tend to value their homes at a higher value than the interviewers do.16  
The final mean house value is €118’000 with a standard deviation of €73’000. These 
figures vary quite a bit by region (Table 2) with Dublin having the highest mean 
house value (nearly double the mean house value at €198’000) however they are well 
distributed within regions (Figure 5). The following section presents the results and 
analysis. 
 
7. Results 
 
This section presents the different segments of the analysis. First the importance of 
geographical dummies when using hedonic analysis is highlighted. Then the absolute 
errors in estimation using different dwelling characteristics are presented followed by 
the A/S ratio analysis. Section 7.4 looks at who would be favourably and adversely 
impacted by different estimation methods followed by tests for vertical inequity and 
section 7.6 looks at what would happen if property tax bands were to be used.  
 
7.1 The importance of geographical dummies in hedonic regressions 
The first step in the analysis is to estimate house values using dwelling characteristics. 
The top panel of Table 3 shows the results of a regression, where house value is 
regressed on the dwelling size in square meters. The results are as expected; as 
dwelling size increases, the house value increases. The R2 for this regression is very 
low, at 17%. If we estimate house values using these regression results and then plot 
the ABV error we get the top panel of Figure 6. This shows, in increasing order, by 
how many euro the model mis-predicts the house price. Anything below the x-axis 
represents an under-valuation of house price by the model and anything over the x-
axis represents an over-estimation. There are some very high value outliers on either 
end of the spectrum and the median error is €18’300. This is not unexpected as we 
would anticipate that regional differences would have a significant effect on house 
                                                 
16 As there are a few extremely high outliers (e.g. a difference of for instance 4.6 million euro) which 
could have been due to coding mistakes (or very optimistic owners!) we cut the top and bottom quarter 
percent of values and the final sample differences are presented in panel (b) of Figure 4. 
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prices. Consequently the regression is re-estimated using interactions with local 
authority dummies and the results are presented in the bottom panel of Table 3. The 
R2 for this regression is already much higher, at 53%. Just one variable, the size in 
square meters of the house when coupled with geographical dummies accounts for 
53% of the variation in house price. It is immediately clear that the ABV errors have 
reduced and the graph in the bottom panel of Figure 6 is leaner. The median error falls 
to 7’300€. Consequently, it is important to include geographical effects in the 
analysis. As it is possible that local authorities would administer the property tax and 
this is the most detailed location variable we have available, we use local authority 
dummies for the remainder of the analysis.17 The following section takes a closer look 
at the different ABV errors depending on the dwelling characteristics used to estimate 
price. 
 
7.2 Absolute value errors 
The least administrative costly taxes are those which require the least amount of 
information to collect. Consequently, a property tax which could equitably be 
implemented using just one dwelling characteristic would be very efficient. The 
previous section showed the absolute value errors using just one variable, size in 
square meters. This section compares the different dwelling characteristics, both 
separately and combined.  
We estimated house value using a series of single explanatory variables, namely, 
number of rooms, number of bedrooms, year built (pre-1940, 1941-1970, 1971-1980, 
1981-1996, post-1996) and dwelling type (detached, semi-detached, terraced house or 
bungalow and apartment). The summary statistics for the ABV errors for these 
regressions are presented in Table 4. The median errors are very low with number of 
rooms being the lowest, followed by size in square metres, number of bedrooms, 
dwelling type and year built. In contrast the standard deviations are much higher at 
approximately €50’000 to €60’000, while the outliers (minimum and maximum) are 
fairly similar regardless of the variable used. The results when using size in square 
meters and number of bedrooms are quite similar, an indication that rooms are a fairly 
good proxy for area. The number of rooms also has a smaller standard deviation.  
                                                 
17 An interaction of town size and county produced similar results. 
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Table 5 presents the same statistics but relating to multivariate regressions, where 
combinations of dwelling characteristics have been used to estimate house value. 
Including all variables in the regression improves the median error and standard 
deviation however it is clear that it is the inclusion of size related variables (number of 
rooms or square meters) that has the largest effect. The inclusion of five variables 
instead of one reduces the median error to €3’900. 
Figure 7 plots the absolute errors depending on the explanatory variable used as in 
Figure 6, but all are plotted on the same graph. Ideally, we would prefer the lines to 
centre on the zero circle. The estimations are quite different at the extremes depending 
on which variable is used but overall the number of rooms tends to stay closest to the 
zero circle. If these results were presented individually, as in Figure 6, the bottom part 
of the graph would have been larger, i.e. dwellings are being under-valued at a higher 
level than those being over-valued. We would expect this to be a good result for 
homeowners, however, it depends on the proportion of the error in relation to total 
house price. Indeed, under-valuation could only occur on very high priced homes and 
over-valuations on lower priced homes, which would be inequitable. Consequently, 
we need to look at the errors in the context of house value, this is the subject of the 
following section. 
 
7.3 A/S ratios and assessment errors 
An estimation error of 50’000 euro is not very large for a home worth 1 million but is 
quite important in the case of a home worth 250’000 euro. We therefore look at 
relative errors. Table 8 presents the summary statistics for the assessment ratios for 
the full sample depending on which explanatory variable or variables are used to 
estimate house price. The mean and median A/S ratios are all larger than one, 
indicating that on average properties are overvalued. This is confirmed by the 
skewness values which are all positive signifying that there is more over-assessment 
than under-assessment. Indicators of size and type result in median A/S ratios that are 
smaller than 1.1, however year built, as a single explanatory variable, is beyond the 
recommended A/S boundary (IAAO). The addition of all variables into the model 
significantly reduces the median A/S ratio and brings it very close to 1. These results 
indicate in first instance that part of the sample is estimated to within a quite close 
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range. However, it is important to look at the dispersion of the estimates. The CODs 
for estimates using size in square meters only, number of rooms only and all 
explanatory variables are 28, 27 and 27 respectively. This is well above the range of 5 
to 15 considered acceptable by the IAAO. This result indicates that the assessments 
are too variable. Figure 8 shows the different AS ratios plotted against house value. It 
is clear that the outliers at both ends of the scale are causing the variability in the AS 
ratios regardless of the model used. Although some are correctly assessed, due to the 
large variability in the assessment for the outliers there is considerable horizontal 
inequity. 
Lin (2009) estimates the number of incorrectly assessed properties using the A/S ratio 
and defines incorrectly assessed properties as those with A/S ratios either one 
standard deviation above or below the mean A/S ratio. According to this criterion, the 
area-only model correctly values 93% of properties. An equal proportion is correctly 
estimated when using all five dwelling characteristics, and 72% when using the 
number of rooms only. This confirms the result above. Although a large number of 
properties are “correctly” assessed, those that are not have very large deviations. The 
next stage in the analysis is to investigate whether these assessment differences relate 
to a specific group of properties or owners. For the rest of the analysis we will only 
present results for three estimations: size in square meters only, number of rooms 
only, and the set of all 5 variables. We include number of rooms even though it relates 
quite well to size in square meters as this allows us to use the much larger sample as a 
check of the consistency of the results. 
 
7.4 Horizontal inequity across groups 
If the assessment model correctly estimates house prices, we should not detect any 
difference in assessment ratios among different types of properties or across owner 
groups. As indicated above, the three estimations produce median results that are 
within an acceptable range, however the dispersion of the results is too large. By 
breaking down the analysis into sub-groups we identify which properties are causing 
the bulk of the errors. We can also identify which household groups are more likely to 
be mis-assessed. Consequently, we break down the A/S ratios by region, by income, 
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by age of the chief economic supporter, by employment class and occupational status 
and rural versus urban dwellings. The results are presented in Tables 9 to 14.  
The regional breakdown indicates that the A/S ratios using 5 variables are all below 
1.1 (both for the mean and the median figures) across all regions. Using just one 
dwelling characteristic increases the ratios, however the median ratios remain below 
1.1 across all regions. A result worth noting in the regional breakdown is that the 
median A/S ratios for Dublin (1.102 and 1.094) are the largest compared to all other 
regions when using just one explanatory variable (rooms or square meters). However 
it is much lower when all five dwelling characteristics are included. This is not 
unexpected as price variability within Dublin would be much higher than anywhere 
else and the geographical dummies only split the city into four. Consequently, 
additional information of dwellings within Dublin is required and the age or type of 
dwelling may well, in the case of Dublin, reflect neighbourhood differences.  
Table 10 shows that the dwellings of people with high incomes are under-assessed. 
The median assessment ratio gets smaller the higher the income. This would tend to 
suggest that any assessment method imposed would be regressive; this is investigated 
further in Section 7.5. The results according to employment class also confirm this 
result, with high professionals’ homes being under-valued (Table 12). Estimation 
results for the unskilled are not within acceptable ranges and the same applies to 
unemployed owners, and those in the “Home duties” and “Other” categories (Table 
13). These results however could be due to small samples in these categories. 
Assessment ratios are too high for the youngest and oldest owners when using just 
square meters as an explanatory variable (Table 11). However they are all within 
acceptable ranges when using the full set of explanatory variables. Finally, there is 
only a slight difference between assessment ratios depending on whether the dwelling 
is located in a rural or urban area. Consequently, the value of properties of younger 
owners, the unskilled and unemployed tend to be over-assessed while high income 
and high professional owners win out. The initial indications seem to be that should 
this type of valuation method be implemented in this case it would be regressive. We 
investigate the issue of vertical inequity in more detail below.  
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7.5 Vertical inequity 
Table 15 presents the results of the models listed in Equations 5 to 8 in Section 5.4. 
The results indicate that for all three models, assessment ratio errors based on hedonic 
valuation would be regressive. For Equation 5, the positive and significant intercept in 
all cases suggests a regressive valuation structure. The coefficient on the house value 
in Equation 6 is negative and statistically significant in all cases, also indicating a 
regressive valuation method. However the coefficient on the slope is extremely small 
as has been found in other studies (Smith, 2000). The coefficient on log house value 
in Equation 7 is smaller than one, again indicating regressivity. Finally, in the case of 
the Bell (1984) model, which incorporates a quadratic term, the results indicate that 
there is accelerating regressivity as the intercept is positive and the coefficient on the 
quadratic variable is negative. Consequently, regardless of the dwelling characteristic 
used to estimate the house price, the resulting valuation method would make 
regressive errors. Lower value dwellings would be over-valued and high value homes 
would be under-valued. Consequently, the inclusion of exemptions for lower income 
groups (the most likely owners of low value homes) and more individual audits for 
very high value homes would be recommended.   
 
7.6 Predicting the tax band and difficulties in self-assessment 
The Commission on Taxation suggested the use of tax bands for self-valuation. This 
allows us to relax the need to precisely assess property.18 The bands suggested by the 
Commission are presented in Table 6 and increase in increments of €150’000. The 
proportion of dwellings correctly assessed using the different models is presented in 
Table 7. Table 7 also shows whether the dwelling was incorrectly put into a higher or 
a lower band than it should have. The proportion of households that are correctly 
assessed is on average above 78%. The use of all five available explanatory variables 
results in the lowest mistake rate (16%). It is also worth noting that of those 
incorrectly assessed, regardless of the explanatory variable used, a higher proportion 
end up in a lower band than their correct band. Therefore, a system based on hedonic 
                                                 
18 With assessment ratios of 1.1 the “acceptable” band is within 10% of the house value (i.e. within 
40’000 euro of a 400’000 euro dwelling) which even at much higher average house prices is well 
below the CoT bands (which increase in increments of 150’000 euro). Consequently, the proportion of 
homes “correctly” attributed will be higher using this criterion.  
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regressions could be used to check fairly accurately whether self-assessed households 
have assessed their property into the right tax band. However, considering the results 
in the previous sections, it would still be necessary to put in place checks to more 
accurately audit very highly priced properties. At the same time, the regressivity of 
the system could be reduced by introducing exemptions for lower value properties and 
low income groups. A tax system using property characteristics as a supplement to 
self-assessment might also help households who are unsure about the price of their 
property to more accurately estimate it. Figure 9 shows that the error in self-
assessment as a proportion of the total property value decreases as household income 
increases. This indicates that lower income households are more likely to self-assess 
incorrectly. A property tax based on self-assessment therefore makes regressive errors 
too, and requires auxiliary policies just like a hedonic-based tax would. However, 
Figure 9 also shows that the errors in a hedonic tax would be larger – unsurprisingly, 
as less information is used to estimate the house value – and more regressive. 
 
8. Discussion and conclusions 
 
This paper examines the implications of using hedonic regressions or a very basic 
type of automated valuation system to estimate the values of properties in Ireland, in 
view of introducing an ad valorem property tax in the Republic. Flat rate property 
taxes are deemed unfair as lower income households pay the same amount as higher 
income households. Consequently, taxes based on the value of the property are 
considered more acceptable19 and a tax on the ownership of property is less volatile 
than the existing stamp duty. The implementation of a property tax does however 
require that a price valuation of the property exists. 
We find that a system based on a handful of property characteristics (as well as 
location dummies) can produce estimates which are within the acceptable bounds as 
defined by the International Association of Assessing Officers. These estimates are 
produced using county dummies. Size characteristics (such as area in square meters 
                                                 
19 Note that a linear ad valorem tax would be regressive, as lower income groups tend to spend a higher 
proportion of their income on housing (based on shares from the Central Statistics Office Household 
Budget Survey, 2005). 
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and number of rooms) produce more accurate estimates compared to, for instance, the 
age of the house. However, the more variables included, the more precise the 
prediction. The precision of the geographical dummies is also important. If a system 
of tax bands, as proposed by the Commission on Taxation (2009) were to be used, the 
hedonic regressions allocate approximately 80% of the sample properties into the 
correct band. However, we found that a valuation system of this type is regressive, 
resulting in lower value homes being over-valued and higher value homes being 
under-valued. At the extremes, using just one property characteristic does not produce 
equitable results.   
Two important issues arise from this exercise. The first is the issue of timing and the 
second is the issue of funding. With regard to the former, if an ad valorem property 
tax were to be introduced in Ireland in the near future, time constraints would result in 
a simple valuation system. Self-assessment has been offered as a potential solution. 
However in a thin recessionary property market, it is difficult for households to 
estimate the value of their property. Without adequate checks and penalties, there are 
incentives to underreport house values. Hedonic house prices, or self-assessment with 
hedonic validation are alternative solutions. It could in parallel be used as a basis for 
collecting information about dwelling characteristics and help build a national geo-
coded database of self-assessed price and house features. It could also be envisaged 
that if a banded system is used, a model based on house characteristics combined with 
geographical dummies could be used to help homeowners identify their own tax band. 
However, as was demonstrated in Northern Ireland, a system based on specific (rather 
than banded) assessments would be fairer. 
Nevertheless, a system of this type should not be seen as an adequate replacement for 
a properly administered automated valuation model. The ultimate objective with a tax 
of this type should be to create a more equitable and precise valuation system as soon 
as possible. The creation of a national house price database is already underway. 
However, with existing house price volatility it will be ineffective unless combined 
with the gathering of information on the house characteristics. All homes included in 
the database will also have to be geocoded so as to facilitate any future valuations and 
so that exact spatial sub-markets can be identified. The range of variables used in this 
analysis is constrained by the variables available in the dataset. Collecting information 
on the total size of the property site including gardens and any land would be more 
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useful than solely using the size of the constructed property. Special consideration 
would also need to be given regarding the valuation of apartments. If funds are going 
to be put towards creating a database, this should be done properly and the experience 
of neighbours should also be considered. As was found in Northern Ireland, “the need 
for good data is imperative and the data must be in place before successful modelling 
is possible” (Gloudemans and Montgomery, 2008: 30). As with any type of tax, 
putting in place exemptions and adjustments for the most vulnerable income groups is 
essential. 
Finally, the issue of the date the valuations are made is important. The Irish property 
market has fluctuated enormously in the last few years and house prices have been on 
a downward course since the beginning of the recession. According to the PTSB/ESRI 
house price index (Q2 2010), property prices in Ireland have fallen by 35% since the 
peak at the end of 2006. Valuing houses based on transactions that took place during 
the boom would result in most cases in homeowners paying tax on a value for their 
home that is unrepresentative of its current market value. If a national valuation of 
properties is to take place, it will be crucial that all properties are valued at the same 
date.  
 
Acknowledgements 
The authors are grateful for comments and suggestions from Tim Callan, John 
FitzGerald and Laura Malaguzzi Valeri at the ESRI and from participants at the TCD 
Development Working Group. Karen Mayor is grateful to the Irish Research Council 
for the Humanities and Social Sciences and the Economic and Social Research 
Institute for research funding.  
 
Bibliography 
 
Allen, Marcus T., and William H. Dare. 2002. Identifying Determinants of Horizontal 
Property Tax Inequity: Evidence from Florida. Journal of Real Estate Research 24 
(2): 153. 
 38
Allen, Marcus T., William H. Dare, and Carl Riegel. 2009. Vertical inequity in the tax 
assessment of lodging properties. International Journal of Hospitality Management In 
Press, Corrected Proof. 
Bell, Michael E., and Charlotte Kirschner. 2009. A Reconnaissance of Alternative 
Measures of Effective Property Tax Rates. Public Budgeting & Finance 29 (2): 111-
136. 
Bird, Richard. 1984. Put up or Shut up: Self-Assessment and Asymmetric 
Information. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 3 (4): 618-620. 
Central Statistics Office. 2008. Construction and Housing in Ireland 2008 Edition.  ed. 
Central Statistics Office. Dublin: Stationery Office. 
Central Statistics Office. 2005. Household Budget Survey 2004-2005 Final Results.  
ed. Central Statistics Office. Dublin: Stationery Office. 
Chapman, Jeffrey I., Robert J. Johnston, and Timothy J. Tyrrell. 2009. Implications of 
a Land Value Tax with Error in Assessed Values. Land Economics 85 (4): 576-586. 
Commission on Taxation. 2009. Report 2009.  Dublin: The Stationery Office. 
Gibb, Kenneth. 1992. The Council Tax: The Distributional Implications of Returning 
to a Tax on Property. Scottish Journal of Political Economy 39 (3): 302-317. 
Goolsby, William C. 1997. Assessment error in the valuation of owner-occupied 
housing. Journal of Real Estate Research 13 (1): 33. 
Griliches, Z. 1961. Hedonic Price Indices for Automobiles. In Price Indices and 
Quality Change: Studies in New Methods of Measurement, ed. Z Griliches. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Gstach, Dieter. 2009. A Property Taxation Mechanism with Self-Assessment.  60 ed. 
International Association of Assessing Officers. 2003. Standard on Automated 
Valuation Models (AVMs).  09-2003  ed., ed. International Association of Assessing 
Officers. Missouri: IAAO. 
International Association of Assessing Officers. 2010. Standard on Ratio Studies.  
2010 ed., ed. International Association of Assessing Officers. Missouri: IAAO. 
International Association of Assessing Officers. 2010. Standard on Property Tax 
Policy.  01-2010 ed., ed. International Association of Assessing Officers. Missouri: 
IAAO. 
Jones, Colin, Chris Leishman, and Allison M. Orr. 2006. The Potential Impact of 
Reforms to the Essential Parameters of the Council Tax.  Fiscal Studies 27 (2): 205-
229. 
McCluskey, W.J., Deddis, W., Mannis, A., McBurney, D. and Borst, R. 1997. 
Interactive application of Computer Assisted Mass Appraisal and Geographic 
Information Systems. Journal of Property Valuation and Investment 15 (5): 448-465. 
 39
McCluskey, William J., Peadar Davis, and Cheng L. Lay. 2007. Residential Property 
Tax Reform in Northern Ireland: Impact Analysis and Spatial Redistribution. Journal 
of Property Tax Assessment & Administration 4 (3): 59-70. 
McMillen, Daniel P., and Rachel N. Weber. 2008. Thin Markets and Property Tax 
Inequities: A Multinomial Logit Approach. National Tax Journal 61 (4): 653-671. 
Muellbauer, John, and Gavin Cameron. 2000. Five Key Council Tax Reforms: And 
12 Reasons to Enact Them. New Economy 7 (2): 88-91. 
Niou, Emerson, and G. U. Tan. 1994. An analysis of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's self-
assessment scheme for land taxation. Public Choice 78 (1): 103-114. 
Plassmann, Florenz, and T. N. Tideman. 2010. Accurate Valuation in the Absence of 
Markets.  36:3 ed. 
Rosen, S. 1974. Hedonic Prices and Implicit Markets: Product Differentiation in Pure 
Competition.  82 ed. 
Smith, Lawrence B., Kenneth T. Rosen, and George Fallis. 1988. Recent 
Developments in Economic Models of Housing Markets. Journal of Economic 
Literature 26 (1): 29. 
Spahr, Ronald W., and Mark A. Sunderman. 1998. Property Tax Inequities on Ranch 
and Farm Properties. Land Economics 74 (3): 374-389. 
Szalai, A, and AT Tassonyi. 2004. Value-based property taxation: options for 
Hungary. Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 22 (4): 495-521. 
Watson, Dorothy, and James Williams. 2003. Irish National Survey of Housing 
Quality.  ed. ESRI. Dublin: ESRI. 
Wolinsky, Asher. 2000. A Market Based Approach to Property Tax.  1320 ed. 
Northwestern University: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and 
Management Science. 
 
 
 40
Tables 
Table 1. Summary statistics for the main variables in the analysis. 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Interviewer Value 25016 118078 73178 33077 763937
Owner Value 25016 122528 76087 31502 930310
Number of rooms 25016 7.04 1.84 2 30
Number of bedrooms 25016 3.68 0.99 1 15
Year built 25016 2.60 1.24 1 5
Dwelling type 25016 1.55 0.75 1 4
Local authority  25016 16.81 9.93 1 34
Region 25016 4.30 2.35 1 8
Occupational class 25016 3.86 1.98 1 7
Rural 25016 0.50 0.50 0 1
CESa age 25016 2.91 0.81 1 4
Employment status 25016 2.25 1.74 1 7
Square metres 7023 147.26 66.90 2.00 928.57
a Chief Economic Supporter 
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Table 2. House values by region, full sample 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Border 4,031 96,253 48,086 33,865 590,673
Dublin  3,930 198,456 102,448 70,881 763,937
MidEast 2,015 141,695 67,360 39,378 669,429
Midland 3,068 93,315 45,644 35,440 551,295
Midwest 2,731 92,671 47,067 33,078 393,782
Southeast 3,895 98,679 50,721 34,114 708,808
SouthWest 2,423 115,636 58,219 35,440 630,051
West 2,923 101,431 56,207 33,078 630,051
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Table 3. Regression results house value regressed on square meters, with (bottom 
panel) and without (top panel) geographical dummies and interactions 
HouseValue Coefficient Std. Err 
Square meters 457.38*** 14.317
Constant 70024.51*** 2315.762
Observations: 7023, R2: 0.17 
 
HouseValue Coefficient Std. Err. 
Square meters 580.20*** 99
Dublin city council 93802.45*** 16771
Dublin south -745.07 18742
Dublin Fingal 49571.09*** 17329
Dun 
Laoghaire/Rathdown 119598.6*** 17184
Kildare 21687.85 19459
Kilkenny -4191.70 19695
Laois 3883.70 18716
Longford -16938.75 19303
Louth 48653.31*** 17989
Meath 39773.84** 18040
Offaly -5346.65 18003
Westmeath 8807.76 19764
Wexford 5951.04 18938
Wicklow -8200.98 20452
Clare 22940.94 18321
Cork city 16198.20 17674
Cork county 29187.22 17824
Kerry 26347.85 18536
Limerick city 19079.13 18249
Limerick county 40626.15** 17884
Tipperary north  -16306.38 17730
Tipperary south  -31983.04 23533
Waterford city 55392.86*** 17927
Waterford county -57643.69** 23226
Galway city 25276.53 20240
Galway county -37438.72* 19975
Leitrim 14462.84 17510
Mayo -26377.72 18761
Roscommon 22634.56 17301
Sligo 24993.97 17466
Cavan 2121.43 19131
Donegal 21123.51 17607
Monaghan 6419.79 20422
Constant 36387.13** 15320
Observations: 7023, R2: 0.53, interactions of square meters and  
Geographical dummies included in regression but not shown.
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Table 4. ABV Error statistics depending on which individual explanatory variable is 
used. 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Median Min Max 
Square meters 7023 0.0001 58319 7322.373 -490157 633198
Dwelling Type 25016 0.0002 56582 9585.908 -606166 244145
Number of rooms 25016 0.0001 49083 6100.632 -542236 369864
Num of bedrooms 25016 -0.0003 53876 8299.977 -575954 415567
Year Built 25016 0.0000 59508 12353.17 -594469 228144
 
 
Table 5. ABV Error statistics depending on which combinations of explanatory 
variable are used. 
Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev Median Min Max 
All variables 7023 0.000047 48031 3888.27 -449697 333510
Square meters, 
bedrooms, yr built, 
dwelling type 7023 0.000078 50483 3950.39 -448209 336543
Square meters and 
dwelling type 7023 -0.000196 55299 5711.44 -489675 502641
Rooms, bedrooms, 
yr built, dwelling 
type 25016 0.000055 45887 4526.06 -531562 377553
Rooms and dwelling 
type 25016 0.000330 47241 4993.05 -541901 359081
Bedrooms, dwelling 
type and rooms 25016 0.000091 47162 5026.39 -542436 354930
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Table 6. Valuation bands as proposed by the Commission on Taxation (2009:166) 
 Valuation Band 
A 0-150’000
B 150’001-300’000
C 300’001-450’000
D 450’001-600’000
E 600’001-750’000
F 750’001-1’000’000
G 1’000’001-1’500’000
H 1’500’001 and higher
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Table 7. Proportion of households being put in the incorrect estimation band by 
explanatory variable used 
Variable Obs 
Proportion in 
incorrect 
valuation band 
(%) 
Proportion in 
lower band 
than correct 
Proportion in 
higher band 
than correct 
Square meters 7023 22.53 13.58 8.94 
Dwelling type 25016 20.03 11.86 8.17 
Number of rooms 25016 17.15 10.39 6.76 
Year built 25016 21.40 12.77 8.63 
Number of bedrooms 25016 19.05 11.99 7.06 
All 5 variables 7023 19.95 10.85 9.10 
Rooms, bedrooms, year 
built, dwelling type 
25016
16.18 9.32 6.86 
Square meters, bedrooms, 
year built, dwelling type 
7023
20.65 11.28 9.37 
Rooms, bedrooms, 
dwelling type 
25016
16.63 9.71 6.92 
Rooms, dwelling type 25016 16.67 10.02 6.65 
Square meters, dwelling 
type 
7023
22.40 12.07 10.32 
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Table 8. A/S ratio summary statistics for entire sample depending on explanatory 
variables used in the hedonic regression 
Variable Mean Std. Dev Median Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
Square 
meters 1.131 0.427 1.066 0.119 8.385 2.72 26.42 
Dwelling 
type 1.166 0.448 1.098 0.145 4.875 1.03 5.12 
Number of 
rooms 1.114 0.372 1.066 0.129 4.306 1.03 5.58 
Year built 1.176 0.449 1.141 0.138 4.353 0.75 4.07 
Number of 
bedrooms 1.142 0.410 1.090 0.145 4.196 0.92 4.74 
All 5 
variables 1.084 0.340 1.036 -0.049 5.235 1.53 9.99 
Rooms, 
bedrooms, 
year built, 
dwelling type 1.100 0.356 1.048 0.159 4.823 1.21 6.87 
Square 
meters, 
bedrooms, 
year built, 
dwelling type 1.095 0.360 1.037 -0.466 5.038 1.60 10.12 
Rooms, 
bedrooms, 
dwelling type 1.107 0.367 1.053 -0.022 4.817 1.20 6.62 
Rooms, 
dwelling type 1.107 0.367 1.053 0.120 4.875 1.20 6.65 
Square 
meters, 
dwelling type 1.117 0.403 1.053 -1.129 5.820 2.12 16.12 
 
 47
Table 9. Assessment ratios by region, using just square meters (top), just number of 
rooms (middle) and using all variables (bottom) 
 
Region Obs Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max 
Border 1241 1.135 0.430 1.059 0.17 5.80
Dublin 1225 1.138 0.428 1.102 0.24 5.32
Mideast 604 1.111 0.399 1.061 0.19 3.85
Midland 884 1.116 0.376 1.069 0.28 4.92
Midwest 784 1.167 0.528 1.074 0.32 8.38
Southeast 835 1.119 0.403 1.040 0.22 3.78
Southwest 677 1.141 0.446 1.051 0.29 4.22
West 773 1.114 0.387 1.065 0.12 3.50
 
 
Region Obs Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max 
Border 4031 1.113 0.376 1.059 0.19 3.96
Dublin 3930 1.103 0.347 1.094 0.20 4.24
Mideast 2015 1.107 0.373 1.050 0.24 3.42
Midland 3068 1.114 0.371 1.052 0.18 3.33
Midwest 2731 1.125 0.388 1.071 0.24 3.20
Southeast 3895 1.114 0.375 1.064 0.15 3.90
Southwest 2423 1.120 0.382 1.069 0.13 3.21
West 2923 1.119 0.371 1.094 0.17 4.31
 
 
Region Obs Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max 
Border 1241 1.085 0.343 1.044 0.08 3.21
Dublin 1225 1.075 0.342 1.031 -0.05 5.23
Mideast 604 1.077 0.331 1.029 0.43 3.08
Midland 884 1.089 0.329 1.037 0.28 2.86
Midwest 784 1.093 0.348 1.050 0.32 3.79
Southeast 835 1.071 0.316 1.021 0.34 2.82
Southwest 677 1.099 0.367 1.043 0.38 3.30
West 773 1.084 0.340 1.029 0.29 3.27
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Table 10. Assessment ratios by income quintile, using just square meters (top), just 
number of rooms (middle) and using all variables (bottom) 
 
Income Obs Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max 
Quintile 1 534 1.288 0.477 1.230 0.32 5.54
Quintile 2 1282 1.209 0.456 1.151 0.22 8.38
Quintile 3 1517 1.152 0.426 1.088 0.12 5.80
Quintile 4 1790 1.106 0.401 1.038 0.17 4.92
Quintile 5 1900 1.041 0.393 0.979 0.19 5.32
 
 
Income Obs Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max 
Quintile 1 2971 1.200 0.392 1.164 0.20 3.90
Quintile 2 5380 1.159 0.374 1.115 0.24 3.96
Quintile 3 6026 1.135 0.374 1.084 0.17 3.21
Quintile 4 5870 1.088 0.360 1.038 0.17 3.50
Quintile 5 4769 1.014 0.343 0.967 0.13 4.31
 
 
Income Obs Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max 
Quintile 1 534 1.113 0.349 1.090 0.33 2.74
Quintile 2 1282 1.132 0.356 1.085 0.37 3.79
Quintile 3 1517 1.112 0.347 1.064 0.28 3.27
Quintile 4 1790 1.078 0.328 1.028 -0.05 3.30
Quintile 5 1900 1.025 0.322 0.980 0.08 5.23
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Table 11. Assessment ratios by age of reference person, using just square meters 
(top), just number of rooms (middle) and using all variables (bottom) 
 
 
Age Obs Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max 
Under 30 324 1.201 0.498 1.125 0.45 5.80
30-45 2280 1.098 0.391 1.046 0.19 5.32
46-64 3133 1.125 0.427 1.058 0.12 8.38
65+ 1286 1.186 0.462 1.112 0.17 5.54
 
 
Age Obs Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max 
Under 30 994 1.078 0.345 1.018 0.26 3.39
30-45 6449 1.069 0.350 1.020 0.13 4.31
46-64 11417 1.116 0.366 1.070 0.15 3.38
65+ 6156 1.162 0.402 1.112 0.17 3.96
 
 
Age Obs Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max 
Under 30 324 1.085 0.333 1.046 -0.05 3.21
30-45 2280 1.074 0.328 1.025 0.29 5.23
46-64 3133 1.091 0.339 1.046 0.32 3.79
65+ 1286 1.082 0.362 1.035 0.08 2.92
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Table 12. Assessment ratios by employment class of reference person, using just 
square meters (top), just number of rooms (middle) and using all variables (bottom) 
 
Employment Obs Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max 
High Professional 1293 1.021 0.393 0.961 0.19 5.32
Low Professional 1543 1.072 0.387 1.012 0.17 4.39
Other non 1228 1.148 0.411 1.076 0.12 4.37
Skilled 1113 1.161 0.381 1.114 0.22 4.11
Semi-skilled 571 1.194 0.461 1.128 0.36 5.54
Unskilled 357 1.302 0.427 1.308 0.39 4.48
Unknown 918 1.221 0.525 1.136 0.35 8.38
 
 
 
 
Employment Obs Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max 
High Professional 1293 1.028 0.340 0.978 0.28 5.23
Low Professional 1543 1.056 0.334 1.013 0.08 2.98
Other non 1228 1.095 0.334 1.042 0.32 3.27
Skilled 1113 1.100 0.322 1.058 0.43 2.48
Semi-skilled 571 1.098 0.317 1.069 -0.05 2.77
Unskilled 357 1.158 0.348 1.124 0.41 2.78
Unknown 918 1.135 0.370 1.085 0.33 3.79
 
Employment Obs Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max 
High Professional 2963 1.006 0.345 0.956 0.13 4.24
Low Professional 4635 1.048 0.362 0.991 0.15 4.31
Other non 4610 1.124 0.374 1.070 0.26 3.96
Skilled 4178 1.138 0.358 1.098 0.24 3.20
Semi-skilled 2498 1.145 0.357 1.105 0.26 3.33
Unskilled 1731 1.204 0.368 1.164 0.31 3.42
Unknown 4401 1.168 0.393 1.117 0.25 3.38
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Table 13. Assessment ratios by employment status of reference person, using just 
square meters (top), just number of rooms (middle) and using all variables (bottom) 
 
Employment Obs Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max 
At work 4924 1.110 0.409 1.048 0.12 8.38
Unemployed 163 1.341 0.591 1.212 0.43 5.45
Home duties 537 1.170 0.424 1.119 0.37 3.33
Student 28 1.328 0.928 1.068 0.78 5.80
Retired 1328 1.162 0.446 1.083 0.30 5.54
Other 43 1.188 0.319 1.170 0.54 1.87
 
 
Employment Obs Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max 
At work 15417 1.093 0.363 1.046 0.13 4.31
Unemployed 602 1.207 0.377 1.154 0.28 3.24
Home duties 2792 1.140 0.387 1.103 0.24 3.96
Student 92 1.076 0.282 1.064 0.53 1.76
Retired 5877 1.142 0.383 1.101 0.20 3.90
Other 236 1.217 0.401 1.126 0.37 2.88
 
 
Employment Obs Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max 
At work 4924 1.084 0.335 1.033 -0.05 5.23
Unemployed 163 1.143 0.401 1.080 0.38 3.30
Home duties 537 1.082 0.331 1.044 0.44 2.82
Student 28 1.142 0.451 1.099 0.79 3.21
Retired 1328 1.073 0.347 1.026 0.32 2.92
Other 43 1.156 0.354 1.164 0.57 2.07
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Table 14. Assessment ratios by rural versus urban, using just square meters (top), just 
number of rooms (middle) and using all variables (bottom) 
 
 
Rural/Urban Obs Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max 
Urban 3288 1.104 0.437 1.043 0.19 8.38
Rural 3735 1.155 0.417 1.088 0.12 5.54
 
 
Rural/Urban Obs Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max 
Urban 12556 1.078 0.331 1.049 0.15 4.24
Rural 12460 1.150 0.406 1.096 0.13 4.31
 
 
Rural/Urban Obs Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max 
Urban 3288 1.044 0.311 1.003 -0.05 5.23
Rural 3735 1.118 0.360 1.067 0.08 3.30
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Table 15. Indicators of vertical inequity, regression model results 
 
 Square Meters Num. Rooms All var 
Coef. Std. Err Coef. Std. Err Coef. Std. Err 
Eq. 
5 
HseVal 0.539*** 0.006 0.550*** 0.003 0.687*** 0.006
Constant 63326.69*** 963.848 53121.34*** 436.953 42953.62*** 896.376
Eq. 
6 
HseVal -2.44E-06*** 5.17E-08 -2.51E-06*** 2.79E-08 -1.56E-06*** 4.34E-08
Constant 1.466*** 0.008 1.410*** 0.004 1.297*** 0.007
Eq. 
7 
LnHVal 0.573*** 0.006 0.599*** 0.003 0.731*** 0.006
Constant 5.046*** 0.069 4.676*** 0.038 3.177*** 0.069
Eq.  
8 
HseVal 0.838*** 0.016 0.847*** 0.008 0.969*** 0.015
HseValSq -6.23E-07*** 3.09E-08 -6.86E-07*** 1.63E-08 -5.88E-07*** 2.87E-08
Constant 38662.13*** 1539.166 31299.48*** 668.974 19662.64*** 1430.13
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Figure 1. Average national house prices (1975-2008) in Ireland for new and second 
hand houses. Source: Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local 
Government. 
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Figure 2. Net receipts of stamp duties (2002-2007) in Ireland (€m). Source: CSO 
Construction and Housing in Ireland Report, 2008 Edition. Based on figures in Table 
5.4.  
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Figure 3. Distribution of dwelling area size (in square meters) for respondents who 
knew the size of their home with a normal distribution plot.  
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Figure 4. Plot of interviewer estimate minus owner estimate of house value. The top 
panel is the original sample. The bottom panel is the reduced sample.  
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Figure 5. Histogram plots of house value by region: Dublin, Border, Mideast, 
Midlands, Midwest, Southeast, Southwest, West. 
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Figure 6. ABV errors from a regression using square meter dummies without 
geographical dummies (top panel) and with geographical dummies (bottom panel) 
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Figure 7. ABV errors from regressions using dwelling type, number of rooms, number 
of bedrooms and year built as individual explanatory variables with local authority 
dummy variables.  
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Figure 8. Assessment ratios against property price calculated using just size in square 
meters (top), just number of rooms (middle) and all five explanatory variables 
(bottom) 
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Figure 9. Mean assessment error (by self-assessment and using just square meters) as 
a proportion of the property value, by income band.  
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